Introduction
Inflation targeting has become a fairly common objective of monetary policy in the past ten to fifteen years; see e.g. (Svensson 2003a) . This general objective can be implemented in a number of different ways. One possibility is to formulate an explicit objective function, i.e. a "general targeting rule" using the terminology suggested by Lars Svensson. A different approach has been the use of a particular target level for the inflation rate. This target is usually specified at some given horizon for the future and we may speak of inflation forecast targeting in this case. Formally, the inflation target is set for some fixed forecast horizon h and policy tries to achieve that target:
Here E t π t + h is the forecast of the inflation for period t + h and in the analysis it will be taken to be the rational expectations (RE) forecast as the central bank is, for simplicity, assumed to know the structural model of the economy.
It can be noted that, if the horizon is long, there will typically be many different paths for interest rates up to the target horizon that achieve the specified inflation target. If this is the case, a fixed inflation target at the specified horizon does not yield a unique value or time path for the interest rate, which is the actual instrument of monetary policy. A further specialization for achieving the fixed target is to use inflation forecasts that are derived as constant interest rate (CIR) projections, see e.g. the discussions in (Leitemo 2003) and (Svensson 1999) . CIR inflation targeting has been advocated as an easily understandable and hence practical approach to conducting monetary policy; for general discussions of its merits and problems see (Goodhart 2000) , (Kohn 2000) , (Svensson 2003b) and (Woodford 2003), pp. 620-623. In practice there appear to be at least two different ways for computing and employing the CIR projections in setting the value for the monetary policy instrument. One approach, which is arguably close to the practice in the UK, has been described by (Goodhart 2000) , p.177: "When I was a member of the MPC I thought that I was trying, at each forecast round, to set the level of interest rates so that, without the need for future rate changes, prospective (forecast) inflation would on average equal the target at the policy".
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Given a model of the macroeconomy, setting the forecast of inflation based on constant interest rates at a given target level of inflation implies a rule for the interest rate.
A second approach to CIR policy-making is in general terms described by the quote "... if the overall picture of inflation prospects (based on an unchanged repo rate) indicates that in twelve to twenty-four months' time inflation will deviate from the target, then the repo rate should normally be adjusted accordingly"; see (Riksbanken 1999) . This way of conducting monetary policy seems (at least implicitly) to be the practice in Sweden.
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In this approach the CIR projection is computed at the interest rate prevailing before any policy decision and the rate of interest is then adjusted depending on the difference between the CIR projection and the inflation target.
We will refer to these two ways of conducting monetary policy in general as CIR inflation targeting and corresponding interest rate rules as CIR rules. In addition, we will refer to the two approaches as CIR
U K
and CIR S policies respectively.
CIR inflation targeting necessarily introduces a further element of forwardlooking behavior into the economy in addition to the forward-looking behavior of private agents that is assumed in many current models for monetary policy. If the model has forward-looking elements, issues of determinacy of rational expectations equilibria (REE) and their stability under (adaptive) learning have been raised in the recent literature. (Bullard and Mitra 2002) have derived constraints on the interest rate instrument (or Taylor) rules that achieve stability and determinacy in a standard New Keynesian model of monetary policy. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) have shown that some standard ways for implementing optimal policy under discretion or commitment can lead to the difficulties of indeterminacy and instability under learning. 
S
policies in these respects. We will argue that CIR U K policies can very often lead to unpleasant outcomes, i.e. the resulting REE can exhibit both indeterminacy and instability under learning. CIR S policies policies perform better with regard to both determinacy and stability under learning, but they are not always problem-free either. We also examine the (more realistic) policy of flexible inflation targeting and the consequences of inherent inertia in inflation and output for the indeterminacy and instability results.
The Framework

The Basic Model
The model we employ is the standard New Keynesian model of monopolistic competition and (Calvo 1983) price stickiness. This model has been employed in numerous recent studies of monetary policy; see e.g. (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) for a survey. The log-linearized model is described by two equations
which is the "IS" curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer optimization, and π
which is the price setting rule for the monopolistically competitive firms.
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We remark that in a later section we will add inertia terms to (2) and (3). The inertia is usually justified by empirical relevance even though the micro foundations of the model are then fairly weak. denote the private sector expectations of the output gap and inflation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these expectations need not be rational (E t without * denotes RE). The parameters ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor so that 0 < β < 1.
The shocks g t and u t are assumed to be observable and follow
where
) are independent white noise. g t represents shocks to government purchases and or potential output. u t represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those entering through x t . For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that µ and ρ are known (if not, they could be estimated).
For brevity, details of the derivation of equations (2) and (3) are not discussed. The derivation is based on individual Euler equations under (identical) subjective expectations, together with aggregation and definitions of the variables. The Euler equations for the current period give the decisions as functions of the expected state next period. Rules for forecasting the next period's values of the state variables are the other ingredient in the description of individual behavior. Given forecasts, agents are assumed to make decisions according to the Euler equations.
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For further analysis we write the model in matrix-vector form
denotes private expectations of y t . The coefficient matrices are 
In the next two subsections we introduce the formalization of CIR U K and CIR S policies. In this and the next section, we consider the case when the central bank tries to hit a certain inflation target at a specified horizon. Such a policy is often termed one of strict inflation targeting, a la (Svensson 1999) and (Svensson 2003a) . Even though this policy is not entirely realistic from a practical point of view since most central banks have output concerns (either implicitly or explicitly), it does serve as a useful benchmark. The case when the bank pursues a policy of flexible inflation targeting is considered in Section 4.1.
CIR U K Policy
We first consider CIR U K formulation of CIR policy. This has been recently formalized by (Leitemo 2003) , which can be consulted for further details. We introduce the (strict) inflation target as in (1), where for simplicity the targetπ is assumed to be zero without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) and h is the targeting horizon.
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We note that in the derivation of CIR policies it is assumed that expectations are rational. For later purposes it will be useful to express this constraint as
To derive the interest rate rule, rewrite (5) as
where 
Pre-multiplying (9) by K yields
targeting policy central bank assumes that
where in (11) it is assumed that expected future interest rates are equal to the contemporaneous interest rate i t for all horizons 0 ≤ j ≤ h − 1. In other words, in the formulation of policy, the bank assumes a constant path of interest rates at the current level. Using assumption (11) in (10) leads to 
We will refer to (13) as the CIR (13), has the general form (14) is thus an instrument rule like the classic rule studied by (Taylor 1993) and it can be explicitly computed for different values of h. For h = 2 we get
It is seen that, for h = 2, the rule (13) surprisingly has χ x < 0, i.e. the interest rate should react negatively to the output gap. For higher values of h the expressions χ i , i = g, u, x, π become cumbersome, but numerical computations indicate that the negative coefficient on the output gap is a robust phenomenon of the CIR U K rule I. This unexpected result can be given an economic interpretation in the case h = 2. To understand this result, it will be helpful to ignore the shocks. Shift the New Phillips curve (3) forward and take RE. Recalling that the inflation target is assumed to be zero, we have
, which pins down the expectations terms in (2) and yields the positive relation between
. By (3) we also have
which indicates that both E
depend negatively on the current output gap under this policy. Finally, rewriting the IS curve (2), ignoring shocks, as on the current x t . We remark that (13) should be viewed as an instrument rule as, in addition to the observable exogenous shocks, it depends on current endogenous variables. It is an instrument rule like the widely discussed rule due to (Taylor 1993) . (13) can be viewed as a behavioral rule in the same sense as demand and supply functions of private agents are behavioral rules, i.e. the central bank "goes to the market" with that schedule and is able to adjust the interest rate within the period.
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Such rules are sometimes said to be non-operational; see (McCallum 1999) ( 13) into (8) we have
for which it is possible to derive the MSV solution of the form
using standard techniques (we omit the precise form of H). (The MSV solutions are REE that are usually employed in the applied literature.) Introducing the partition
, we can rewrite the interest rule (13) as i
which we will call the CIR U K rule II.
CIR S Policy
As mentioned in the Introduction, an alternative interest rule, which we call a CIR S rule, is based on computing CIR forecasts of inflation at the interest rate before any policy decision and then changing the interest rate if the forecast deviates from the target. Formally, the policy-maker first makes a forecast of inflation, conditioned on a constant interest rate level at the level of i 1 ) denotes the inflation forecast conditioned on the last period interest rate, i.e., the bank assumes
instead of (11). We again assumeπ = 0, w.l.o.g. ω > 0 determines the magnitude of the extent of increase in i t when the inflation forecast is above
target. From (10) we now have
Written explicitly, (18) takes the form
where the coefficients ψ
can be computed for different values of h. For example, when h = 2, these take the values
Using (19) in (17), we obtain CIR S rule I of the form
Note that the CIR S rule I, (20), captures a form of interest smoothing frequently observed in the data.
As before, we can also define an interest rule which depends solely on predetermined variables using the MSV solution of the model when CIR 
where the coefficients b x , ... need to be determined. Furthermore, for a determinate MSV solution, we have |b i | < 1, and using this solution in CIR S rule I, (20), we may obtain uniquely CIR S rule II below
Here
describe the dependence on the shocks (their precise form is not needed in the computations). 
Calibration Scenarios
In several places we will need to revert to numerical results in the study the properties of CIR policies introduced above. For our numerical analysis, we will frequently adopt three calibration scenarios proposed in the literature.
, and λ = 0.024.
Calibration CGG: β = 0.99, ϕ = 1, and λ = 0.3.
Calibration MN: β = 0.99, ϕ = 0.164, and λ = 0.3.
These are taken, respectively, from (Woodford 1999), (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) , and (McCallum and Nelson 1999) . For an analysis of Estability, we sometimes need the values of ρ and µ and we set these at ρ = 0.9 and µ = 0.35 in accordance with the literature.
Determinacy and Learning Stability
Results for CIR
U K
Policies, Types I and II
We consider whether CIR U K interest rate rules, either in the form (13) or (16), yield determinacy and stability under learning of the MSV REE. We will assess stability under learning using the concept of E-stability, which is known to be the relevant condition for convergence of adaptive learning formulated using least squares and closely related learning rules. Formal analysis of determinacy is standard; see e.g. (Blanchard and Kahn 1980) or Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). For an analysis of E-stability in models like this, we refer the reader to (Bullard and Mitra 2002) for an overview and to (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for a detailed discussion. The analysis is conducted using the forward-looking model (2) and (3), together with either (13) or (16).
It is convenient to start with CIR U K rule II (16). Plugging this rule into the model (5) leads to the reduced form
In the basic model it has unpleasant properties on both counts: 
The matrix for computing determinacy is then given by B is inside the unit circle. When h = 2, we can obtain a partial result on determinacy. The following proposition is proved in Appendix B:
Proposition 3 Let h = 2 and 0 < ω < 1. The necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is that the expression E given below be positive, where
If the expression above is negative, we have indeterminacy. In general, determinacy depends on the structural parameters. For the three baseline calibrations, it is easily checked that the expression above is positive when 0 < ω < 1 so that determinacy always obtains. For higher horizons, the characteristic polynomial for B 3 becomes quite cumbersome so that we will examine determinacy numerically below without employing Proposition 3.
To analyze E-stability, we need to put the system in the following form In the determinate case, there is only one solution ofb with eigenvalues inside the unit circle; in the indeterminate case there may exist more than one.
For the analysis of learning, agents have a PLM of the form
from which one can compute expectations We now look numerically at E-stability of the determinate MSV solution for different horizons h, ranging from 2 to 8. Table 1 below reports a pair of critical values of ω, (ω,ω) such that for all 0 < ω ≤ω, one has determinacy with the determinate MSV solution being E-stable. For values of ω such thatω < ω ≤ω, one has determinacy but the determinate MSV solution is E-unstable. Values of ω >ω lead to indeterminacy.
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For h = 2, we find thatω =ω so that only one number is reported for the h = 2 column. The determinate solution usually turns out to be E-stable (there are only some exceptions). However, the range for which determinacy and E-stability hold shrinks quite rapidly as the horizon increases. When h = 8, only very small values of ω yield determinacy and E-stability.
Note that, in the interest rule ( and these resemble the form of a Taylor type rule with interest rate smoothing. With this rule, the Taylor principle (T P ) corresponds to the requirement We conjecture that the key to the failure of determinacy and E-stability is the fact that the rule (20) fails to be super-inertial since 1 + ωψ i < 1. With strict inflation targeting, it can be verified analytically that ψ i < 0 for all horizons h so that the rule is merely inertial. An explanation for this conjecture will be provided later.
For CIR
S rule II we have both indeterminacy and E-instability (the proof is in Appendix B):
Proposition 4 CIR S -rule II associated with (19), i.e. equation (24), leads to both indeterminacy and instability under adaptive learning of the MSV solution for all horizons h.
Extensions
Flexible Inflation Targeting
CIR
U K
Rules
We examine some extensions to our basic model. The analysis of Section 2 has assumed that the central bank pursues a policy of strict inflation targeting, which serves as a useful benchmark. We now turn to the arguably more realistic case where the bank also has concerns for output in its loss function.
With flexible inflation targeting and assuming that the target levels for output gap and inflation arex andπ, the central bank's optimality condition (under discretion) can be shown to be αx t + λπ t − (λπ + αx) = 0, see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) for the details. Thus, the bank seeks to achieve
We again rewrite this constraint as
Except for the change in K, the rest of the analysis formally proceeds as before. The form of CIR U K rule I continues to be given by (13) with K as defined in (31). As before, we assumex =π = 0 (w.l.o.g.).
Obviously, some assumptions about α must be made. In the numerical analysis we assumed that α ranges from 0.1 (low concern for output) to 0.9 (high concern for output) at intervals of 0.1. We continue to have:
Result: Under CIR U K rule I the REE is indeterminate and the MSV solution is E-unstable.
This result was obtained for the all examined α and across all three calibrations. As for CIR U K rule II, Proposition 1 continues to be applicable for the case of flexible inflation targeting since the rule still depends only on the exogenous shocks.
CIR
S
Rules
Since the bank's targeting rule is now given by (31), a rule analogous to (17) in this case can be written as
If the bank expects the expression within parentheses in (32) to be positive, then interest rates should be raised to reduce inflationary pressures in the economy. According to (32) the nominal interest rate is raised if the optimal combination of forecasted output gap and inflation exceeds the corresponding combination evaluated at the target values.
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For the formal analysis we remark, αλ
) will be of the same form as the right hand side of (18) except for the change in K, namely K = (0, 0, αλ − 1 , 1). Again, we simplify by assumingx =π = 0 and continue to obtain from (32), an interest rule of the form (20) but with different coefficients. For example, with h = 2, the coefficients are Note that for large enough α, ψ i > 0 (and ψ x > 0, ψ π < 0). One can verify analytically for higher horizons that the same features are true and, consequently, the interest rules are super-inertial for α large enough.
It can also be verified analytically that for all horizons h = 2, 3, .., 8 the interest rule (20), continues to satisfy the Taylor principle since
Since only K changes, the rest of the formal analysis proceeds as in Section 2.3. We examine determinacy and E-stability for CIR S rule I for values of 0 < ω ≤ 15 and for values of α between 0.1 and 0.9, both at intervals of 0.1. Remarkably, numerical results suggest the following general conclusion:
Result: Most values of α lead to determinacy and E-stability of the determinate solution for horizons h = 2, 3, .., 8.
The conclusion shows that if the bank has sufficient concerns for output in its loss function and adopts a rule of the form (32), CIR S rule I policy performs well in terms of determinacy and E-stability.
The detailed findings are as follows. For the W calibration, we find that for all h, all values of α, ω examined lead to determinate REE which are also E-stable. The corresponding rule (20) has its coefficients satisfying ψ x > 0, ψ π < 0, and 1+ωψ i > 1. So even though the response to π t is of the "wrong" sign, the rule is nevertheless super-inertial.
For the MN and CGG calibrations, the general theme is unchanged. With either calibration, we find that values of α ≥ 0.3 lead to determinacy and Estability for all h (with the CGG calibration only α ≥ 0.2 suffices). In other words, a sufficient concern for output eliminates problems of determinacy and E-stability. In addition, the associated rules tend to be super-inertial since 1 + ωψ i > 1, i.e., ψ i > 0 (they also satisfy ψ .
suggest that an important reason for determinacy and E-stability is the superinertial nature of the associated interest rule, which seems to be true even when ψ π < 0, or ψ x < 0. > 0 and dependence on lagged data) and found these to be conducive to E-stability of the MSV solution for the basic model (5). They also found that superinertial rules that depend on contemporaneous data on inflation and output and the lagged interest rate, as in rule (20), were conducive to determinacy and E-stability.
Finally, we remark that Proposition 4 continues to be applicable for CIR S rule II since it was applicable for any determinate MSV solution under all parameter values.
Inflation and Output Inertia
The model given by (2) and (3) is entirely forward-looking and as a result has difficulty capturing the inertia in output and inflation evident in the data; see (Fuhrer and Moore 1995b), (Fuhrer and Moore 1995a) and (Rudebusch and Svensson 1999) for empirical results. We now look at an extension of this model considered in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), Section 6, with important backward-looking elements. This model consists of the structural equations
The parameters θ and γ capture the inertia in output and inflation inherent in the model and are assumed to be between 0 and 1. The shocks g t and u t continue to follow the process (4). We outline the formal analytical procedures in Appendix C. 
CIR U K
Rules
The CIR U K rule I, equation (43), under strict inflation targeting has the general form
and it is possible to compute this rule explicitly for different values of h. For instance, with h = 2, the rule is
Note that the response of the interest rule to the contemporaneous output gap is negative (as in the non-inertial model) and, in addition, the response to lagged inflation is now negative. Similar qualitative responses follow for other horizons. We examine determinacy and E-stability in the model with inertia (33), (34) for the CIR When h = 2, there is indeterminacy for all values of output and inflation inertia. The MSV solution turns out to be unique but it is not E-stable:
rule I leads to indeterminacy in the model (40) when h = 2. There exists a unique MSV solution, which is E-unstable.
The result is proved in Appendix C. For h > 2, we need to resort to numerical analysis and we let γ and θ take values from 0.1 to 0.9 at intervals of 0.1. be more than one in the indeterminate region. The final column examines E-stability of the stationary MSV solutions whether in the determinate or indeterminate region. The table shows that most values of inflation and output inertia lead to indeterminacy when h = 4. Even if determinacy obtains, the (locally) unique solution is usually E-unstable. In the indeterminate region, all MSV solutions always turn out to be E-unstable.
Similar results follow for higher horizons. These results indicate that policy using CIR U K rule I continues to have undesirable properties in the presence of inertia.
For brevity, we do not report the performance of CIR U K rule II here. We have checked numerically that the qualitative features of this rule are basically unchanged from those of CIR U K rule I. Most parameter values continue to lead to indeterminacy and all MSV solutions are E-unstable.
CIR
S
Rules
We consider the performance of CIR S rule I in the presence of flexible inflation targeting.
9
For simplicity, we assume µ = ρ =x =π = 0. In the presence of inflation inertia, the targeting rule (31) takes the form
compare (6.4) in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) . 0 ≤ã π < 1 is the solution of the lagged inflation term in equation (6.5) of (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999). When γ = 1,ã π = 0. We first summarize the general nature of the results in this case.
Results: The CIR S rule I continues to perform well in the presence of low levels of output and inflation inertia. The presence of high levels of inertia hampers the performance of this rule.
Consider first determinacy under the rule. Table 3 depicts the region of determinacy when h = 8 for the W and CGG calibrations. For each value of γ in the first row, the table reports the critical valueθ such that one has determinacy for all θ ≥θ when α ≥ .8. For the W and CGG calibrations, there typically exists no stationary REE for values of θ <θ. For the W calibration, one has determinacy (typically) whenever α ≥ .1. However, for the CGG calibration, there are indeterminacy problems even for moderate and relatively high values of α, especially when inflation inertia is high. For example, when θ = .9, one has indeterminacy for α between .1 and .7 when γ = .1, while the same problem persists for values of α between .1 and .4 when γ = .2.
It seems, therefore, that determinacy can fail in the presence of high levels of inertia in the model and, even if determinacy prevails, the determinate rule I in the presence of inflation inertia only, i.e., the case θ = 1. We observed that with low levels of inflation inertia (i.e., high γ values like .8, .9), the determinate solution is typically E-stable whereas for larger levels of inflation inertia, the determinate solution is typically E-unstable.
Concluding Remarks
The results in this paper suggest that the conduct of inflation targeting by using CIR policy is subject to two fundamental difficulties. First, there may be multiple stationary RE solutions under such a policy. Second, the suggested interest rates rules of this approach can lead to instability of equilibria under learning. We remark that optimal inflation targeting policies, discussed e.g. in (Svensson 2003a) , are an alternative to CIR policies and there seem to be ways to implement them to achieve determinacy and learnability; see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) .
We have examined two versions of CIR inflation targeting, which we called CIR U K and CIR
S
. It was found that CIR U K policies are particularly vulnerable to the twin problems of indeterminacy and E-instability in all versions of the models examined. CIR S rule I, on the other hand, has more appealing features in terms of determinacy and E-stability in the forward-looking model, especially when flexible inflation targeting is employed. However, its performance can be problematic in the presence of high inflation or output inertia. One reason for the poor performance may be the relative simplicity of the rule itself. In inertial models one may have to look at other rules to deliver a robust performance. We leave a detailed investigation of these issues to the future.
The basic analysis can be extended in various ways. First, we made the strong assumption that the central bank knows the structural parameters of the economy when it computes the CIR interest rate rule. If structural parameters are not known, they can be estimated from data as in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) . A result of (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) shows that an interest rate rule that leads to instability under learning when the policy-maker knows the structural parameters does not fare better when structural parameters are estimated. We conjecture that an analogous result will hold for CIR interest rate rules.
Second, we have limited attention to the computation of CIR policy sug-gested by (Leitemo 2003) . While Leitemo's approach is very natural, the appendix of (Svensson 1998), which is the unpublished version of (Svensson 1999) , suggests a different formulation of what is meant by inflation targeting with a fixed target at fixed horizon. Svensson's approach is quite general as he constructs consistent internal forecasts relative to any fixed interest rate rule beyond a specified horizon. However, formulations of Svensson's approach in the basic forward-looking model make the interest rate dependent only on exogenous shocks, and a result analogous to Proposition 1 is then applicable. Moreover, as pointed out by (Leitemo 2003) , further consistency restrictions naturally arise. For example, Leitemo's rules of the form (13) and (16) do not meet consistency beyond and within the targeting horizon.
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 we first note that it is unnecessary to consider the exogenous shocks for these results. They play no role in indeterminacy and also, in this setting, the E-instability part follows from considering the model without the shocks. We first consider determinacy for 4 ≥ h ≥ 2 and Estability for 4 ≥ h > 2. The final part of the proof concerns E-stability when h = 2 as this case raises special issues.
Substituting (14) into (5) and omitting the shocks, we have the system , where
Since both variables are free, we need both eigenvalues of M − 1 N to be inside the unit circle for determinacy whereas for E-stability we need the real parts of the eigenvalues of M − 1 N to be less than 1. Alternatively, conditions for determinacy and E-stability may be given in terms of the trace and determinant of M − 1 N as the system is two-dimensional. The necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy turns out to be
where Abs refers to the absolute value of the bracketed expression. The necessary and sufficient condition for E-stability turns out to be
We now examine determinacy and E-stability for various horizons h using the above conditions. In the case h = 2 matrix M is singular, but we can assess determinacy by computing
Both eigenvalues of N − 1 M are zero, so that we have indeterminacy. The analysis of E-stability for h = 2 is given later since the singularity of M raises additional technical and conceptual issues.
In the case h = 3 we get
It is easy to check that Det(M In the case h = 4 we have
so that both indeterminacy and E-instability prevail. Finally, we consider E-stability for h = 2. Substituting the interest rate rule when h = 2 into (5) we can obtain the system Substituting the PLM and the forecast into (38) yields the equations Ma = Aa Mb = AbV + P to compute a and b. It is easily verified that these equations have a unique solution.
Next, consider E-stability. The first step is to consider the temporary equilibrium for given forecasts, i.e. the equations has either a unique solution or a continuum of solutions since the rank of M is 1. Correspondingly, the rank of I ⊗ M is 2. This means that there is either no ALM for a given PLM or the ALM is not unique. The analysis of E-stability must thus be restricted to those PLM that lead to a solution for a * and b * . However, in this case the non-uniqueness of the ALM present a further difficulty as the E-stability differential equations are then not well-defined.
We can analyze E-stability only in partial manner in which, for example, only one component of a * and a take values other than the MSV REE values while the other component is kept at the REE value. 
where we use the notation
) for the elements of the two matrices. We have
so that these two differential equations are locally stable. For vecb * and vecb it is easily seen that the system is block diagonal since
This form implies that we can have one component from each block to deviate from the REE to define the E-stability equations. Moreover,
so that the E-stability differential equations for the first block are
where "other" refers to constant terms that do not affect stability. Both of these differential equations are stable. Finally, for b we get the same differential equations, except that ρ replaces µ in the matrices. This completes the proof of E-stability.
B Results for CIR S Rules
Proof of Proposition 3: When h = 2, the characteristic polynomial of the determinacy matrix B
where E is as defined in Proposition 3. Woodford has given necessary and sufficient conditions for exactly one eigenvalue of B 3 to be inside the unit circle (which is the condition for determinacy) in terms of the characteristic polynomial, see Proposition C.2, p. 672 of (Woodford 2003). If 0 < ω < 1, then p(1) < 0, so that we are in Woodford's Case I (i.e., (A.1) holds). Consequently, determinacy holds iff p(−1) > 0 which is equivalent to E > 0. Note also that p(0) = C 0 > 0 when 0 < ω < 1 and since p(1) < 0 then, we necessarily have one eigenvalue of B 3 inside and one outside the unit circle so that we always have either determinacy or indeterminacy depending on the position of the third real eigenvalue (i.e., there always exists at least one stationary REE).
Proof of Proposition 4: Using (24) in the basic model (5), we obtain the following system, where ς has eigenvalues with real parts less than one. It is easy to see that one eigenvalue ofˆ +ˆ b is zero and the remaining two are given by those of the matrix A in (6). A has an eigenvalue more than 1 so that all MSV solutions of the model (39) are necessarily E-unstable. This result is again independent of the horizon used by the bank and structural parameters.
C Details for the Inertial Model
As in Section 2.2, we can write the model with inertia in matrix form as 
with B and D as defined before in (6). Strict inflation targeting is defined as before by equations (1) and (7) leading to a form corresponding to (8): 
where y Note that the lagged output gap and the g t shock do not appear in the reduced form system (44); the interest rule has offset both these terms. The MSV solution of (44), consequently, takes the form 
It is easy to verify that there exists a unique MSV solution of this form and it involves a 
We now check E-stability of this unique MSV solution. Assuming agents have a PLM of the form (45) and these forecasts used in (44) lead to an ALM of the same form. If agents use t − 1 data to compute their forecasts, the E-stability conditions for such a system are given by Proposition 10.1 in (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) . For the constant term, the eigenvalues corresponding to the following characteristic polynomial p(τ ) need to have negative real parts for E-stability.
However, p(0) < 0, p(∞) > 0 which implies that there exists a positive eigenvalue.
